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THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES:
THE COMMISSIONER AND AN
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
FROM A CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE
GREGOR LENTZE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Sport is "diversion, amusement, recreation, a pleasant pastime, hav-
ing an athletic character."' However, professional sport in the United
States means significantly more than that and, in 1995, sport is commer-
cialized entertainment and big business in addition to competition. The
perpetual enthusiasm of sports fans provides considerable profits for
professional sports participants. For professional athletes, average sala-
ries have reached a remarkable level.2 The leagues have tremendous
television contracts3 and the broadcasting companies use professional
sports as their most important medium to sell commercial time.4 Finally,
the operation of a sports enterprise is a profitable investment for the
owners.
5
* LL.M., 1995, Temple University School of Law, cur laude. Mr. Lentze previously stud-
ied law at the Univesity of Bayreuth in Germany and at Ludwig-Maximillians University of
Munich. He is now employed by the Bavarian government in Germany and is also an assis-
tant for Professor Wolfgang Fikentscher at Ludvig-Maximillians University of Munich.
1. NEw WEBSTER DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 942 (1981).
2. In 1994, the average salary in the NBA was $1.38 million, in Baseball $1.2 million, in
the NFL $737,000 and in the NHL $525,000. See, e.g., Steve Zipay, A Bitter Pil" All Four
Major Leagues Choking on Owners' Cure-All, NEWSDAY, Oct. 5, 1994, at A78.
3. The NBA's four-year contracts with NBC and TNT/TBS are worth $1.1 billion. See,
e.g., Richard Sandomir, N.B.A. and Turner in 4-Year Pact, N.Y. TInms, Sept. 22, 1993, at B18.
The NFL gets from Fox for the National Football Conference rights $1.58 billion and the NHL
made a five-year contract with Fox for $155 million annually. See, e.g., Richard Sandomir, Fox
Adds Some Pucks to its Expensive Collection of Footballs, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 14, 1994, at B14.
Major League Baseball had a contract with CBS for four seasons (1990-1993) for $1.08 billion
and now has established a joint venture with ABC and NBC until 1999. See, eg., Richard
Sandomir, Baseball Breaks With its Television Past, N.Y. TImms, May 9, 1993, at 1, 7.
4. See, e.g., Joe Logan, Banking on Super Bowl's Commercial Appeal, PHILADELPHIA IN-
QUIRER, Jan. 24, 1995, at El (the price for a 30-second commercial during the 1995 NFL
Super Bowl was one million dollars).
5. The average franchise value in 1994 was $107 million. In the last 85 years, the price of a
professional sports team, has, on average, increased approximately 15% annually. In transac-
tions between 1990 and 1994, the median price appreciation was 11.7%, which was 65% better
than the price performance of the stock market as measured by the Standard & Poors 500
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
Here, the focus should lay on the owners' operation. For them, the
major sources of income are gate receipts, local broadcasting, national
broadcasting, and concessions, of which broadcasting has been the most
important.6 Early in the development of professional athletics, sport
promotors realized that athletic competitors must become business part-
ners to maximize profits.7 From a strong economic point of view,
"[f]orming [a sports] association... enhances efficiency because it in-
creases the marketability of the generic product that previously existed
and marketing a product becomes more successful than without the
integration."'
An important aspect of the economics of sports is that trends in the
sources of revenue and cost play an important role in determining the
organizational structure of a league.9 In fact, the organizational struc-
ture of a league is influenced by the relative importance of league man-
agement and centralized decision-making regarding certain significant
sources of revenue.'" Therefore, professional sports evolved from mod-
est recreational beginnings into sophisticated business operations,1 pro-
moting extensive league managment rather than individual team
management. Thus, the four major team sports-football, baseball,
hockey and basketball-are organized in self-governance associations,
the "professional sports leagues." This Article will discuss the legal con-
cept of these professional sports leagues.
over the same period. See Michael Ozanian & Brooke Grabarek, Throughout History the
Prices Paid for Teams Have Almost Never Gone Down, FIN. WORLD, May 10, 1994, at 61
(annual report of professional franchises). For a comprehensive explanation of the efficency
effects of investment in professional teams for the owners, see Roger G. Noll, The Economics
of Sports Leagues, in LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS 17 (Gary A. Ueberstine
ed., 1991).
6. Noll, supra note 5, § 17.02, at 17-20.
7. Comment, Discipline in Professional Sports: The Need for Player Protection, 60 GEO.
L.J. 771, 772 (1972). This construction is primarily an issue in the antitrust context, because
the principle "competition on the field, cooperation off the field" leads to the question of to
what extent a professional sport league can be regarded as a "single entity" under § 1 of the
Sherman Act.
8. This is the conclusion of the "Chicago School." Robert H. Heidt, Don't Talk of Fair-
ness: The Chicago School's Approach Toward Disciplining Professional Athlethes, 61 IND. L.J.
53, 55-56.
9. See Noll, supra note 5, § 17.01, at 17-20.
10. Id. For particular economic decisions regarding certain revenue sources, it is desire-
able to act on behalf of the league collectively, eg. the league contracts for national broadcast-
ing rather than individual team contracts, and collective bargain agreements with the player
associations rather than individual club contracts.
11. See Comment, supra note 7, at 771 (footnote omitted).
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It might be expected that these professional sports leagues are organ-
ized in a corporate governance structure as are the majority of business
associations in the United States. However, despite this radical transfor-
mation in sophisticated business operations, the simple organizational
structures which characterized the early developement of various sports
have been retained.' 2
Most likely, the main reason for the reluctance to alter the original
governance structures is the remarkable success of professional sports in
the present form. Certainly, this success is significantly influenced by
public policy and the judicial and legislative treatment of the leagues.
Moreover, sport entrepeneurs have succeeded in obtaining special status
for professional sports leagues in some decisive aspects. 13 Particular ex-
amples of this success include the Sports Broadcasting Act,'4 the tax
treatment of team transactions, 5 and the special status of the leagues.' 6
"Yet, industries built upon special institutional arrangements are always
precarious, for what the political process gives, it can take away."' 7
The discussion in this Article does not measure the legal concept of
the professional leagues solely in its economic context, provided by pub-
lic policy. Rather, there is a question as to what extent the present gov-
ernance structure actually provides a desireable concept for all
participants. Part II will show the present governance structure of the
professional sports leagues. Part III will focus on the office of the Com-
missioner and his authority and function in the concept of the leagues.
12. Id.
13. Noll, supra note 5, § 17.04, at 17-31-32.
14. 15 U.S.C.S. § 1291, 1294 (1994) (exempts the professional sports leagues from anti-
trust laws for agreements covering sport contents).
15. A major factor affecting the economic returns to sports investments is the accounting
system that is used to determine a team's tax liability. The possible amortization of player
contracts provides an especially effectful tax shelter for the owner when purchasing a team.
See Steven Braun & Michael Pusey, Taxation of Professional Sports Teams, 7 TAX ADVISER
196-206 (1976).
16. Baseball is fully exempted from antitrust laws. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258
(1972). However, in a recent case the court ruled that the exemption affects merely the re-
serve system and is not applicable for franchise ownership or location of franchises. Piazza v.
Major League Baseball, 831 F.Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993). See, e.g., Latour R. Lafferty, The
Tampa Bay Giants and the Continuing Vitality of Major League Baseball's Antitrust Exemp-
tion: A Review of Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1271 (1994). The
other leagues may rely on the labor exemption from the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Ethan Lock,
The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 DutKn L.J. 339 (1989).
17. Noll, supra note 5, § 17.04, at 17-32. Congress has recently threatened to'withdraw
baseball's antitrust exemption. Bills were introduced in 1993 in both the House of Represent-
atives, H.R. 108, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) and the Senate, S. 500, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993).- Neither of these bills was successful.
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Part IV will show the objectives of league organization and Part V dis-
cusses to what extent the Commissioner's office is appropriate to the
several parties. Finally, Part VI will consider conceiveable alternatives
to the current organizational structure from a corporate perspective.
II. ORGANIZATIONAL FORM OF THE PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
LEAGUES
A. The National Football League (NFL)
The NFL is an unincorporated association, not organized or operated
for profit.18 However, the NFL carries out several business transactions
through its independent NFL Properties, Inc., which is operated for
profit.
Membership and the rights thereof are limited and restricted. 19 Any
person, association, partnership, corporation, or other entity is eligible
for membership as long as not operated for profit. Each entity or each
person holding any interest in the applicant must be approved by the
affirmative vote of no less than three-fourths of the members. A three-
fourths majority is also required to transfer a membership to another
entity. Each member holds a franchise from the league to operate a pro-
fessional football club in a designated city.20
There are two sources of authority in the NFL: the Executive Com-
mittee and the Commissioner. The Executive Committee includes one
representative from each member club, usually the owner of the club.2'
It has the power given by the Constitution"' and acts by affirmative vote
of no less than three-fourths. The Commissioner is also present at each
meeting of the Executive Committee.
The Commissioner is elected by the owners and possesses discipli-
nary power, dispute resolution authority, and decision-making authority,
including the power to appoint other officers and committees. 3 Basi-
cally, the Commissioner has executive power unless the collective bar-
18. National Football League Constitution and Bylaws Art. II, § 2.2 [hereinafter NFL
CONST.].
19. See NFL CONST. art. III., § 3.1-3.9.
20. The franchise renders territorial rights to the club. Relocation of the franchise is pos-
sible with an affirmative vote of three-fourths of the owners. The present attempt of the L.A.
Rams' owner to move her team to St. Louis was rejected by the owners. Thomas George,
N.F.L. Owners Reject Rams' Bid to Move to St. Louis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1995, at B15.
21. See NFL CONST. art. VI., § 6.1-6.9.
22. See NFL CONSr. art. VI., § 6.5 (includes the power to impose fines or additional pen-
alties upon any members after action of the Commissioner).
23. See infra part III.
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gaining agreement with the Players Association renders specific powers
to other authorities.
B. The National Basketball Association (NBA), the National Hockey
League (NHL) and Major League Baseball (MLB)
The NBA and the NBL are, roughly speaking, organized in the same
manner as the NFL. They are unincorporated, non-profit associations 4
with limited membership and a franchise system.2 However, unlike the
NFL, there is no membership restriction for corporations. The leagues
have an elected Commissioner with similar power and the owners are
organized in a common council, called the "Board of Governors. 'z6
Baseball is structured somewhat differently. The two leagues, the
American League of Professional Baseball Clubs and the National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs, are unincorporated non-profit
associations with limited membership and a franchise system.27 Basi-
cally, these two leagues are independent from each other with their own
executive power. 8 The Major League Baseball Agreement contains the
governing rules for the business of baseball. The agreement renders the
power to the Commissioner2 9 and sets up an Executive Council,3" made
up of the Commissioner, the two league presidents, and six other own-
ers. The Executive Council shall prepare and submit to the leagues the
rules of the game for consideration and adoption.
III. THE LEAGUE COMMISSIONER
All professional sports leagues described above have one important
thing in common-the position of a Commissioner.3 The existence of
this position plays a decisive role in the structure of the leagues and may
24. National Basketball Association Constitution and By-Laws § 2 [hereinafter NBA
CONST.]; National Hockey League Constitution and By-Laws § 2.2 [hereinafter NHL CONST.].
25. NBA CoNT. § 7, 9; NHL CONST. § 3, 4.
26. NBA CONST. § 18; NHL CoNsr. § 5.
27. Constitution and Rules of The National League of Professional Baseball Clubs § 2.2
[hereinafter NBL CONsT.]; Constitution of The American League of Professional Baseball
Clubs § 2.5 [hereinafter ABL CONST.].
28. NBL CONST. §§ 5.1, 7.1 (president under supervision of executive committee); ABL
CONST. §§ 5.1, 6.1 (president under supervision of board of directors).
29. Major League Baseball Agreement art. I [hereinafter MLA].
30. MLA art. II. (the Commissioner shall serve as chairman and has the right to vote
upon all matters).
31. The title "President" was changed to "Commissioner" in the NFL in 1941. THF NFL's
OFFICAL ENCYCLOPEDIC HISTORY OF PROFESsIONAL FOOTBALL 33 (1977). In the NHL, the
title was changed in 1993. Joe Lapointe, NHL Goes to the Hoop for First Commissioner, N.Y.
TiNics, Dec. 12, 1992, at 1, 33.
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explain the respective organization of the leagues. However, what does
it mean-league commissioner?
A. Creation and Development of the Commissioner's Office
To understand the function and existence of the Commissioner in the
structure of professional sports leagues, it is helpful and necessary to
look at the history of the Commissioner's office. The office of the Com-
missioner was created in baseball on January 12, 1921 in the new Major
League Baseball Agreement. The creation was a response to several
events which had happened in the years before.
In 1903, the National and American Leagues established professional
baseball in form of the Major League.32 The League was governed by
the so-called "National Commission," which consisted of the two league
presidents and a third member chosen by them to serve as chairman.33
However, because of the personal interests of the members, the Com-
mission remained largely ineffective and was frequently criticized in sub-
sequent years. The final impulse for the creation of a single
Commissioner was given by the "Chicago Black Sox" scandal in 1920.31
The public confidence in the game decreased significantly. In particular,
the National Commission received serious criticism for not investigating
the scandal with as much intensity as the situation warranted.35 Finally,
in order to restore public faith in the honesty and integrity of the game
and protect their own interests, the owners replaced the National Com-
mission with the position of a single Commissioner.
The new single Commissioner was to be disinterested and independ-
ent from baseball. The first candidate for Commissioner was Judge Lan-
dis, who demanded control over "whatever and whoever" had anything
to do with baseball.36 The owners complied with this demand and, thus,
the new Major League Baseball Agreement gave this position broad and
32. See Major League Baseball News Release, The Commissionership - An Historical
Perspective 22 [hereinafter The Commissionership] (1903 was the year of the first World Se-
ries in baseball).
33. See HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE GOLDEN AGE 9 (1971).
34. The scandal affected the 1919 World Series: the heavy favorite, the Chicago White
Sox, lost against the Cincinnati Reds. Rumors immediately circulated that the Series was fixed
and, finally, after a court investigation, White Sox players confessed that they had accepted
gamblers money to "throw" the series. Id. at 308-309.
35. The reluctance of the Commission to investigate is not surprising at all, given that the
chairman of the Commission at the time was August Herrmann, the president of the Cincin-
nati Reds, the winner of the affected World Series. See The Commissionership, supra note 32,
at 5.
36. SEYMOUR, supra note 33, at 322.
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comprehensive power. In their effort to clean up the sport and to restore
integrity to the game, the owners established a single omnipotent posi-
tion that has the power to "take away or materially affect significant
property interests" of all persons involved in baseball.37
The terms and the authority of the Commissioner's position have not
changed significantly during the last seventy years. In 1944, after the
death of Judge Landis, the owners restricted the authority of the Com-
missioner and changed the Major League Agreement in two important
ways.3 8 In 1964, however, the owners withdrew these changes and
granted even broader power to the Commissioner.39 The Major League
Agreement still gives the Commissioner the power his office attained
about seventy years ago.
The Commissioner posts in the other leagues were created for many
of the same reasons as the baseball commissionership,4 ° raising the ques-
tion about the desireability and workability of the commissionership in
modem professional sports. It must be examined whether this authority
is merely a relic from the past that should be reconstructed, or if it pro-
vides a workable concept for a professional sports league in 1995.
B. Scope of Commissioner's Authority - Differences from the
Corporate Chief Executive Officer
The Commissioner is the chief executive officer (CEO) of the
league.4 Like the CEO in a corporation, the Commissioner is elected
by the owners and is an employee of the league.42 The essential question
is to what extent the Commissioner resembles the CEO of any other
37. Jeffrey A. Dumey, Comment, Fair or Foul?, The Commissioner and Major League
Baseball's Disciplinary Process, 41 EMORY L.J. 581, 582 (1992).
38. First: clubs would be free to challenge actions in court. Second: conduct which did not
violate a specific league rule could not be found by the Commissioner to be detrimental to the
best interests of baseball. See The Commissionership, supra note 32, at 6.
39. First, the policy of prohibiting court challenges was resurrected. Second, under the
new agreement the commissioner is allowed to take action against any act believed to be "not
in the best interests of baseball." This is in fact a broader formulation than the previous "...
detrimental to the best interests of baseball.. ." formulation. Matthew B. Pachman, Limits on
the Discretionary Powers of Professional Sports Commissioners: A Historical and Legal Analy-
sis of Issues Raised by the Pete Rose Controversy, 76 VA. L. Rv. 1409, 1417 n.52 (1990).
40. The first Commissioner for the NFL was elected in 1921, R. TREAT, THE ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF FOOTBALL 655 (1975); in the NBA in 1946, THE OFFICIAL NBA BASKETBALL ENCY-
CLOPEDIA 13 (1989); and in the NHL in 1924 (until 1993 the title was president). STAN
FIsCHLER & SHIRLEY WALTON FISCHLER, THE HOCKEY ENCYCLOPEDIA 3 (1983).
41. MLA art. I, § 2(a); NFL CONST. art. VIII, § 8.4 (B)(b); NBA CONST. § 24; NHL
CONST. § 6.3(a).
42. MLA art. I, § 7; NFL CONsT. art. VIII, § 8.1 (b); NBA CONST. § 24(a); NHL CONST.
§ 6.1.
1995]
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usual corporation. In contrast to corporate CEOs, league Commission-
ers has been described in phrases such as "czar"4 3 or "absolute despot
with power of the proverbial pater familias."4 Therefore, the question
arises as to what kind of power is inherent in the office of the Commis-
sioner that leads to such commentaries.
1. Scope of Authority and Control
In a typical business corporation, all corporate powers shall be exer-
cised by or under the authority of the board of directors.45 Although it is
generally recognized that the board of directors is not expected to oper-
ate the business itself,46 this basic principle of corporate governance has
a decisive impact, since all power of the executives must be delegated to
them through the By-Laws47 and is merely derivative. By contrast, the
league constitutions give the commissioner's office its original power and
no further delegation of power is necessary.48 Thus, the source of power
for the Commissioner is different.
This distinction in the source of power has an important consequence
for the governing structure of the league. In a corporation, the CEO is
subject to the direct control of the board.4 9 By contrast, the Commis-
sioner does not act under the direct supervision and control of the own-
ers.50 In fact, the Commissioner may carry out the business of the
professional sports league without direct control of the owners. Largely,
many of the decisions involve the Commissioner's sole discretion. The
impact is remarkable: the Commissioner acts as an employee of the
league, but is not under the control and supervision of its own employer.
Therefore, the employed Commissioner represents an almost autono-
mous authority within the internal structure of the league, uncontrolled
by its principal owners.
43. See Durney, supra note 37, at 583.
44. Milwaukee American Association v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 299 (N.D. Ill. 1931).
45. See REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORPORATE Acr § 8.01 (1994) [hereinafter RMB CA].
In this chapter, the RMBCA and the related "Model By-Laws - A Long Form, By-Laws of
Business Enterprises" [hereinafter Model By-Laws], reprinted in SELECTED CORPORATION
AND PARTNERSHIP STATuTEs, RULES AND FoRMs 497-509 (Lewis D. Solomon et al. eds.,
1994), should be the applicable standard for the usual business corporation.
46. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRucruRE OF THE CORPORATION § 11.1, at 143 (1976).
47. See Model By-Laws art. IV, § 5.
48. See MLA art. I, § 2; NFL CONST. art. VIII, § 8; NBA CONST. § 24; NHL CONST. § 6.
49. See Model By-Laws art. IV, § 5; RMBCA § 8.01, official comment (there is even a
responsibility of the directors to exercise oversight over the officers).
50. The NBA constitution merely renders the general supervision to the Board of Gover-
nors. NBA CONST. § 18(a). However, the Commissioner does not in fact act under control of
the board.
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That leads to the question of what kind of authority the league con-
stitution renders to the commissioner's office. Basically, the Commis-
sioner possesses decision-making, dispute resolution and disciplinary
power of which the latter one is the more significant one.
a. Disciplinary Power of the "Best Interests" Clause
The Commissioner represents the internal disciplinary system of the
league. The Commissioner's disciplinary power is conferred through the
"best interest" clauses of the respective league regulations.51 At his sole
discretion, the Commissioner has broad power to investigate any con-
duct or activity deemed "not in the best interest""2 of the sport. The
Commissioner may also impose sanctions upon finding any owner,
player, or other persons involved in the sport guilty of such conduct. In
fact, the Commissioner is vested with investigative, prosecutorial, and
adjudicative powers. Thus, the clause is a powerful tool which "can be
used to justify nearly any action taken by the Commissioner. 53
b. Dispute Resolution Authority
The league regulations vest the Commissioner's office with the au-
thority to arbitrate disputes between members of the associations 54 and
the Commissioner has full, complete, and final jurisdiction of any dis-
pute.55 The Commissioner is the arbitrator for all disputes except those
51. MLA art. I, § 2(a); NFL CONsr. art. VII, § 8.13; NBA CONSr. § 24(j); NHL By-Laws
§ 17.3(a).
52. The NFL Constitution refers to conduct "detrimental to the welfare of the League."
NFL CONST. § 8.13.
53. Durney, supra note 37, at 607. The various Commissioners have invoked the "best
interest" clause several times in the past. The first action taken by a Commissioner was Judge
Landis' life suspension for the players involved in the Black Sox scandal. This action showed
the strength of his authority, since the players were suspended even though they had been
acquitted by the court. Likewise, several players have been suspended for on-the-field and
off-the field conduct. Furthermore, the Commissioners in the various leagues have invoked
the "best interest" clause to severely sanction owners' conduct. See, e.g., George F. Will, A
One-Man Error Machine, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 6, 1990, at 58 (Fred Saigh, the owner of the St.
Louis Cardinals, was forced to sell his interest in his team after he was convicted of tax eva-
sion.); Atlanta National League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ga.
1977) (Atlanta Braves owner Ted Turner was suspended for one year from the business of
baseball.); Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 906 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (Pete Rose, manager of the
Cincinnati Reds and baseball's all time hit leader, was banished in August of 1989 by Commis-
sioner Giamatti for alleged gambling activities.)
54. MLA art. VII, § 1; NFL CONST. art. VIII, § 8.3; NBA CONSr. § 24(c); NHL CONST.
§ 6.3(b).
55. MLA art. VII, § 2; NFL CONST. art. VIII, § 8.3; NBA CONST. § 24(c); NHL CONST.
§ 6.3.(b) (only the NHL leaves a general possibility for the parties to choose other
arbitrators).
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excluded by the collective bargaining agreements. For example, respec-
tive agreements between the owners and the Players Associations have
established salary arbitration and grievance arbitration for disputes in-
volving the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement
provisions. 6
c. Decision-Making Authority
Under common law principles of corporate law, the CEO carries out
the ordinary business, but has no authority for extraordinary business
affairs.5 7 The respective league regulations address the basic authority of
the Commissioner in a different fashion.5 8 Yet, leagues ordinarily fur-
nish the Commissioner with some significant authorities beyond the or-
dinary business.
The Commissioner may disapprove any contract entered into by a
franchise with a player or with television networks, and no sale or trade
by a club is binding without approval of the Commisssioner.5 9 In other
words, the Commissioner has the power to invade directly into the af-
fairs of the association members, the teams themselves. He has great
influence on the owners' decision of approval of admission or transfer of
membership, since the Commissioner conducts the investigation and
submits the application with a recommendation to the owners.6 0 More-
over, the Commissioner interprets and establishes policy and procedure
with respect to the league provisions as the centralized control in the
administration of the league.61
56. See Basic Agreement between The American League of Professional Baseball Clubs
and The National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Major League Baseball Players
Association, Jan. 1, 1990, art. VI(F), XI [hereinafter Basic Agreement]. Akin agreements
exist as well for the other leagues.
57. Lee v. Jenkins Brothers, 268 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 913 (1959).
58. MLA and NBA merely name him as CEO without further explanation, so the usual
standard might be applicable. The NFL CoNs-r. § 8.10 ("no binding effect for 'substantial
commitment' by the league") excludes the extraordinary business expressly; by contrast, NHL
CONST. § 6.3(a) gives authority for "general supervision and direction of all the business and
affairs of the league .... .
59. NFL CoNsT. art. X, § 10.1, art. XV, § 15.4, art. XVI, § 16.8; NBA CoNsr. § 24(0. In
Baseball the right to approve player contracts is within the authority of the league presidents.
Basic Agreement art. IV.
60. See, e.g., NFL CONsT. art. III, §§ 3.3(A)(C), 3.5(B); NBA CONSr. § 9A(b) (Commis-
sioner appoints an investigation committee).
61. MLA art. I, § 2(e); NFL CONsT. art. VIII, § 8.5; NBA CONS-S. § 24(e). In addition, the
NFL Commissioner has the power to appoint other officers, committees, and departments
under his exclusive control. See NFL CONsT. art. VII, § 7.1 (a), art. VIII, §§ 8.7, 8.8.
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2. Limitations
The Commissioner's power to arbitrate disputes is limited by the fact
that he both formulates rules and procedure and acts as an arbitrator
thereof. Consequently, courts have expressed concern over the dual
functions of arbitrator and administrator.62 Moreover, when the Com-
missioner has exceeded the bounds of his authority, courts have not hesi-
tated to interfere with his activities. 63 Finally, the Commissioner has no
authority to arbitrate disputes excluded by the collective bargain
agreements.
In the disciplinary area, courts have difficulty defining the boundaries
of the Commissioner's power, since the scope of his power under the
"best interest" clause remains difficult to determine. The broad and un-
determined term "best interests" tends to give almost unlimited power
and provides only a vague standard.' However, the courts have expan-
sively applied the function of the clause in favor of the Commissioner by
giving him alone the power to interpret this vague standard.65 The sole
restraints by the regulations are related to the extent of monetary pun-
ishment,66 but not to the invocation of the power itself.
3. Conclusion
Even though the Commissioner is the chief executive officer and em-
ployee of the league, his scope of authority goes far beyond the authority
under the usual corporate governance concept and the respective league
regulations give a Commissioner significantly more power. In particular,
62. See JoHN C. WEiSTART & CyM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 440-446 (1979)
(discussion of the Commissioner's dual role). See, eg., Natonal Football League Player Ass'n
v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1974) (the Commissioner may not arbitrate the merits of his
own conduct and review his own actions).
63. The Commissioner has no authority to settle self-created disputes. Professional
Sports, Ltd. v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, Ltd. Partnership, 373 F. Supp 946, 952 (W.D.
Tex. 1974) (Commissioner may not arbitrate where no dispute between the parties exists).
See, e.g., Atlanta National League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ga.
1977).
64. See Durney, supra note 37, at 607-608. This standard is an inappropriate base because
it is "closely analogous to clauses deemed too vague to be legally enforceable." Ie at 607.
65. See, e.g., Charles 0. Finley & Co., Inc. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 876 (1978). See, e.g., Atlanta National League Baseball Club, 432 F.Supp. at 1222;
Milwaukee American Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298 (N.D. Ill. 1931). When one Commissioner
asked what the best interest of baseball clause meant, his attorney answered, "it means any-
thing you want it to mean, Mr. Commissioner." Joe Illuzzi, UPI, Aug. 5, 1985, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
66. MLA art. I, § 3(e); NFL CONST. art. VIII, § 8.13; NBA CONST. § 35(e); NHL By-Laws
§ 17.3.
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the Commissioner does not act under control of his employer, the
league. Rather, the league owners, as the Commissioner's factual em-
ployer, are themselves subject to the disciplinary power of the Commis-
sioner. Thus, there is some question about why the multi-billion dollar
team owners are willing to subject themselves to the broad power of an
omnipotent Commissioner instead of appointing a CEO, furnished with
the power of the Revised Model Business Corporate Act (RMBCA)
model, and acting under their control.
C. Problem of Judicial Interference and Basic Due Process of Internal
Proceedings of a Private Association
1. Interest of an Association to Avoid Judicial Interference
a private association has an interest in avoiding judicial review of
their activities, since judicial proceedings invoke litigation costs of time
and money and "divert attention and resources from the game being
played on the field." 67 Judicial review and control means decreased au-
tonomy of the association. This loss of autonomy by judicial interference
results in a higher risk and uncertainty for the monetary investments.
Thus, it is in the team owner's interest that their investments are gov-
erned by an internal authority that provides more certainty than outside
judicial forces.
2. Judicial Review of Private Associations in General
a. Courts Reluctance to Review
In general, courts have been reluctant to take jurisdiction over the
affairs of private associations and to review their internal actions. 68 The
judicial restraint finds its source in the generalized freedom of associa-
tion implicit in the First Amendment and the concept of liberty found in
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment.69
Another argument for providing associations with immunity from judi-
cial review is based on the fact that the relation between the league and
its members is contractual in nature.70 Furthermore, the restraint of ju-
67. Michael J. Willisch, Comment, Protecting the "Owners" of BasebaL" A Governance
Structure to Maintain the Integrity of the Game and Guard the Principals' Money Investment,
88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1619, 1625 n.43 (1994).
68. Note, Developments in the Law: Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76
HARV. L. REv. 983, 990 (1963). See, e.g., Finley, 569 F.2d at 542.
69. Note, supra note 68, at 1055. See, e.g., Durney, supra note 37, at 596.
70. See Durney, supra note 37, at 596 (the courts hesitate to relieve the parties from the
contractual terms they accepted upon joining the association. "The constitution, by-laws, and
rules of the association are part of the contract accepted by a member." Id. at 597).
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dicial interference finds support in policy and efficency reasons. As con-
firmed by the courts, judicial review of every sanction imposed by the
Commissioner would produce an unworkable system for the leagues.7
b. Requirement of Effective Internal Methods of Control
The right to self-governance for a private association is not unlimited
and under certain circumstances a private association may be subject to
judicial scrutiny. The enforcement of rules and procedures of an associa-
tion must not be arbitrary or against public policy.72 However, courts
will not interfere if "effective nonjudicial methods of control are avail-
able."'73 Therefore, a professional sports league must provide an effec-
tive method of control that cannot be regarded as arbitrary or against
public policy. Yet, there is some question about what type of proceed-
ings are regarded as sufficient to provide an "effective internal method
of control" and which standard the internal league proceedings have to
meet in order to provide the necessary control.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guar-
antees procedural and substantive due process of law for state actions.
However, since private conduct is not governed by the Constitution,74
this standard is not directly applicable to the professional sports leagues
as private actors.
Yet, courts have demanded that an association provide basic due pro-
cess of law when an interest of substance is affected.7' Because member-
ship in a professional association is an interest of substance,76 the
professional sports leagues have to provide basic due process in their
internal proceedings. To meet the standard of basic due process, an as-
sociation has to follow its own bylaws and procedures and the proceed-
ings cannot be tainted by bias, prejudice, or lack of good faith.77
71. Atlanta Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1223 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
72. See, e.g., Higgins v. American Society of Clinical Pathologists, 238 A.2d 665, 671 (N.J.
1968). See Dumey, supra note 37, at 596.
73. See Note, supra note 68, at 993.
74. See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988). See, e.g., Finley, 569 F.2d at
544 n.62 (strict adherence to judicial standards of due process would be arduous and might
seriously impair the proceedings of voluntary associations).
75. Finley, 569 F.2d at 544. See, eg., Durney, supra not 37, at 601.
76. See, e.g., Virgin v. American College of Surgeons, 192 N.E.2d 414, 422 (Ill. App. Ct.
1963).
77. Id. at 423. See, e.g., Finley, 569 F.2d at 544 n.65 (the tribunal has to be impartial and
fair); Willisch, supra note 67, at 1626.
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Furthermore, there has to be a "meaningful notice and hearing" as pro-
cedural safeguards.78
c. Waiver of Recourse
The owners have manifested their desire to shelter league activities
from judicial review by enacting the "waiver of recourse" clause in the
respective regulations. 79 In general, provisions to waive all review of an
arbitrator's decision in private agreements have been upheld by the fed-
eral courts as not violating due process.80
However, a waiver of recourse clause does not preclude judicial re-
view of proceedings violating basic due process. In fact, the clause "adds
little if anything to the common law rule of nonreviewability of private
association actions and can be upheld as coinciding with the common
law standard disallowing court interference. 8' Accordingly, the clause is
invalid if the proceedings fail to provide basic due process of law. 2
d. Conclusion
Even though a private association is free to set up its own rules of
procedure, it is subject to judicial scrutiny unless it provides its members
basic due process. To ensure such due process and to avoid judicial con-
trol, professional sports leagues are supposed to set up fair and impartial
internal proceedings. If the league does not provide due process, the
courts might interfere despite existing waiver of recourse clauses.
3. Commissioner's Function in Providing Basic Due Process
Thus, to afford basic due process, a league must provide impartial
and fair proceedings as an effective internal method of control. In gen-
eral, "the effectiveness of such internal appeals will be limited by the
extent to which the interests of the reviewing body coincide with those of
the group taking the action."8 3 Therefore, basic due process requires the
reviewing body of league activities and decisions to be independent from
78. See, e.g., Riko Enter., Inc. v. Seattle Supersonics Corp., 357 F.Supp. 521, 526
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (provision of the NBA Constitution invalidated because of the absence of
such a procedural safeguard).
79. MLA art. VII, § 2 provides: "... to be finally and unappealable bound by such actions
and severally waive such right of recourse to the courts as would otherwise have existed in
their favor." Similar regulations can be found in NFL CONST. art. VIII, § 8.3; NBA CONST.
§ 24(k); NHL CONST. § 6.3(b).
80. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
81. Finley, 569 F.2d at 543.
82. Id. at 544.
83. Note, supra note 68, at 993.
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the owners as the acting group.8s As a result, owner-led disciplinary pro-
ceedings would result in court findings that due process had not been
met.
To avoid judicial interference, there must be a disinterested review-
ing body with the power and independence to sanction players and own-
ers alike. The Commissioner must have no financial interest, direct or
indirect, in any professional sport.85 By that, the Commissioner is sup-
posed to be this disinterested reviewing body within the leagues. With
the power to discipline owners as well as players, the Commissioner shall
provide an internal method of control that obviates the need for judicial
interference into league's affairs.8 6
D. Conclusion
The Commissioner has significantly more authority than the usual
chief executive officer in a business corporation. In particular, the team
owners, as a "quasi" board of directors, are subject to his disciplinary
power under the respective "interest" clauses. However, due process of
law concerns provide an argument for the traditional model of a strong
and independent Commissioner. The likely rationale for the Commis-
sioner's broad authority is that, as a disinterested party, he shall provide
due process in internal proceedings to avoid judicial interference with
league affairs.
IV. OBJEcIvs OF THE LEAGUE ORGANIZATION
The respective organizational structure of the league has to further
primarily two objectives. First, the league needs an internal, impartial
and fair authority to resolve disputes and to enforce the disciplinary pro-
cess. This is necessary to maintain the integrity of the game and to pro-
84. In fact, "if the owners double as disciplinarians, they would effectively function as the
prosecutor, judge, and jury when sanctioning themselves and their employees." Willisch,
supra note 67, at 1627.
85. NFL CONST. art. VIII, § 8.2; NBA CONST. § 24(b); NHL CONST. § 8.1. The MLA
does not address the independence of the Commissioner explicitly.
86. See, e.g., Willisch, supra note 67, at 1624-25; Dumey, supra note 37, at 603. By con-
trast, the NCAA has been sucessful in due process challenges, even though they do not have
an explicit disinterested authority within the organization to protect the athletes interests.
See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). However, the NCAA, which is run by
about 1000 member colleges and universities, finds itself in a significantly different context
than the professional sports leagues. The professional leagues and teams employ professional
athletes with a strong business purpose, whereas the NCAA merely organizes the collegiate
sport of students who do not get paid.
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vide basic due process in order to avoid judicial interference with league
affairs.
The impartial authority has a strong protective function within the
league. Since professional sports leagues are regarded as monopolostic
business associations,87 the team owners as the association members may
exercise monopoly power. Thus, a main rationale of an internal review-
ing body in the league shall be to shelter other participants from the
owners' monopoly power. The protection of the non-owner parties by
an impartial authority becomes more important with regard to the fact
that professional sports is moving towards corporate ownership.88 With
traditional business interests getting into the games, the need for protec-
tion of the parties increases.
Moreover, the importance of such an independent, impartial author-
ity within the league can be recognized in labor disputes between owners
and players. As an unbiased and independent authority, the Commis-
sioner may play a decisive role in strikes or lockouts. He might invoke
the best interest clause and avert a work shutdown by demanding that
owners stop a lockout or by ordering players to play.89 The fact that
Major League Baseball has not had an independent Commissioner since
September 199290 might be one reason for the longest strike in profes-
sional sport history.91
87. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Break up the Sports Monopolies, in THE BusiNESs OF PRO-
FESSIONAL SPORTS 152-174 (Paul D. Staudohar & James A. Morgan eds., 1991).
88. See, e.g., Michael Ozanian & Brooke Grabarek, The $11 Billion Pastime; Why Sports
Franchise Values are Soaring Even as Team Profits Fall, FIN. WORLD, May 10, 1994, at 50-55
(At least 40 public companies have ownership interests in 22 franchises. In particular, there is
a trend of media companies acquiring sport franchises, eg. Walt Disney, Turner Broadcasting,
ITT, Tribune Company, Blockbuster Video). Only the NFL prohibits corporate ownership.
See NFL CONsT. art. III, § 3.2.
89. The Commissioners of baseball played an important role in the lockout in 1976 and
the strike in 1985. See Willisch, supra note 67, at 1638-39 nn.129, 130, & 132. Commissioner
Fay Vincent was called a "pivotal player" in the resolution of the 1990 spring training lockout.
See Marty Noble, Fay's Autonomy Divides Owners, NEWSDAY, June 11, 1992, at 139.
90. The elected Commissioner Fay Vincent resigned under the owner's pressure on Sep-
tember 7th, 1992. Two days later, Bud Selig, the owner of the Milwaukee Brewers, was named
interim Commissioner until a new labor agreement is reached with the players. George Ves-
cey, A League of Their Owners Strikes Out the Manager, N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 13, 1992, sec. 4, at
2.
91. See Frank Dolson, Ending Baseball's Strike the Easy Way, Name a Strong Leader as
Commissioner, PHILADELPHIA INOUIRER, Mar. 12, 1995, at C2 (citing view of former National
League president Bill White). The players strike in baseball was ended after 234 days after
the NLRB had sought an injunction against the owner's uniliteral decision to change the col-
lective bargaining agreement. See Murray Chass, 234 Days Later: The Players Are Asked to
Report to Camps by End of Week, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 3, 1995, at Al.
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Secondly, a league needs an efficient decision-making process. As a
common undertaking of several team owners, the league must have a
centralized authority to control the administration and to represent a
unanimous opinion of the several owners in public. In order to be effi-
cient for the owners, this centralized authority must exclusively protect
their interests.
The following section will discuss which model for a professional
sports league can best provide both effective decision-making and an im-
partial authority within the league.
V. THm TRADIIONAL COMMISSIONER MODEL
A. Commissioner's Conflict of Interest
An obvious problem with the league's governing structure arises out
of the Commissioners "dual role as guardian of the game and business
champion."'  On the one hand, the Commissioner has the power to su-
pervise, sanction, and even suspend team owners under the power of the
"best interests" clause. On the other hand, the Commissioner is an em-
ployee of the league and, thus, employed and elected by the owners who
determine the Commissioner's term and compensation. Ironically, the
Commissioner, as an employee, has the disciplinary power over his own
employer.
Even though a relationship to one party will not generally be viewed
as evidence of prejudice and does not necessarily disqualify the Commis-
sioner as impartial and fair authority, 93 there exists at least a strong con-
ffict of interest for the Commissioner. 94 To maintain the integrity of the
game and to protect all parties equally, the Commissioner must make
decisions contrary to the owner's interests. However, the Commissioner
has a personal interest in not offending a bloc of owners in order to
protect his own job security and to avoid dismissal by the offended own-
ers. The Commissioner has to ensure the owner's goodwill regarding his
concern about re-election or job termination.95
92. Willisch, supra note 67, at 1622.
93. See Weistart, supra note 62, at 444. See, e.g. Pachman, supra note 39, at 1428.
94. Likewise, the "outside director" in a business corporation is subject to the same con-
flict of interest. In order to separate management and control, the "outside director" is sup-
posed to control and supervise the executives. However, the "outside directors" are chosen
usually by the CEO. Thus, the "outside director" tends to act in the interests of the CEO in
order to secure his own position. See, e.g., Victor M. Earle, Corporate Governance and the
Outside Director - A Modest Proposal, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 787 (1979).
95. The Major League Agreement, NFL Constitution, and NHL Constitution do not ad-
dress premature termination of the Commissioner. The NBA merely addresses termination
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As a result of this conflict, it is very likely that the Commissioner will
tend to avoid a dispute with the owners and make decisions in the own-
ers' favor. The Commissioner's incentive to control and sanction the
owners is significantly reduced and a conflict of the game's and the
owner's interests is likely to be resolved "in favor of the owners pocket-
books. ' 96 Accordingly, the enforcement of control and due process in
the internal proceedings of the professional sport leagues depends heav-
ily and solely on the person of the Commissioner itself and to what ex-
tent the Commissioner is willing to use the power of the office. Yet,
because of the conflicting interests, there is some serious doubt as to
whether the present system itself in fact can provide basic due process in
the form of an impartial and unbiased authority.97 For the non-owner
participants, 98 the present organizational form seems to be inappropriate
to provide a fair and unbiased authority as required by basic due
process.
B. The Owners' Perspective
The Commissioner's position represents a comfortable instrument
for the owners which, from the owners point of view, fullfills two impor-
tant functions. First, the Commissioner shall provide basic due process
and enhances the hurdle for termination. See NBA CONST. § 24(a) (requires a vote of three-
fourths). Termination of the baseball Commissioner was at issue in 1992 in the dispute be-
tween the baseball owners and Commissioner Fay Vincent. Vincent himself claimed that cer-
tain language in the MLA bars firing the Commissioner. See Robert L. Bard & Lewis
Kurlantzick, Can the Baseball Commissioner Be Fired?, 208 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1992) (nothing in the
MLA directly supports the position of Vincent that a termination is absolutely barred by the
MLA. Moreover, an interpretation of an absolute prohibition of termination would be
unenforcable under employment principles which deny an injunction. Therefore, in absence
of a regulation, the Commissioner might be released by a majority vote and could merely sue
for monetary damages). However, the owners did not try to remove Vincent, but voted to ask
Vincent to resign. After a 18-9-1 vote of non-confidence, Vincent resigned. See Ross
Newhan, Embattled Vincent Resigns as Baseball Commissioner, L.A. Tims, Sept. 8, 1992, at
A9. Accordingly, the Commissioner's conflict of interest is not reduced by the league regula-
tions by giving him extraordinary job security.
96. Willisch, supra note 67, at 1622.
97. See Durney, supra note 37, at 607 (denies fairness and impartiality of the present
disciplinary system under the Commissioner). See Note, Pinch-Hitting for Baseball's Present
System - Impartial Arbitration as a Method of Dispute Resolution, 14 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 691
(1981) (dispute resolution process under the Commissioner is unfair).
98. According to a former baseball player, the Commissioner's job in baseball consists of
"protecting the financial interests of the business groups which make profits from baseball."
See Jim Bouton, Ball Four Plus Ball Five 408 (1981). Marvin Miller, former Executive Direc-
tor of the Major League Baseball Players Association, finds the Commissioner closely allied
with the owners. See MARVIN MILLER, A WHOLE DIFFERENT BALLGAME: THm SPORT AND
BusINESS OF BASEBALL 383, 406 (1991). See, e.g., Weistart, supra note 62, at 442-443.
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to obviate judicial interference. 9 Secondly, since the Commissioner
conducts the ordinary business of the league, decision making by the
Commissioner significantly reduces the direct accountability of the own-
ers. The Commissioner's authority embodies unpopular as well as popu-
lar decisions and the Commissioner, not the owners, is blamed for
unpopular decisions. It seems that the "Commissioner is hired to make
difficult managerial decisions and the current structure allows the own-
ers to abandon the commissioner once the problematic decision is
made."100
For the owners this structure is merely a comfortable instrument as
long as the Commissioner is acting primarily in their interests. This
might be very likely given the Commissioner's apparent conflict of
interest.
Nevertheless, league regulations leave a broad authority for the
Commissioner and enable him to act against the owners' interests and
opinions. If the Commissioner is willing to do so, he may be a very un-
comfortable authority for the owners. Even though the Commissioner is
elected by the owners, there is a permanent risk that the Commissioner
does not care about job security and, in order to protect the interests of
the sport, will act in contrast to the owners' interests. After the conflict
with Commissioner Vincent in 1992, the baseball team owners appointed
a restructuring committee to examine and rewrite the power of the Com-
missioner. 1 1 Apparently, the baseball owners are no longer willing to
take the risk of an uninterested Commissioner who is not primarily pro-
tecting their interests.
99. See supra part III.C.3.
100. Willisch, supra note 67, at 1623 (footnote omitted). In the words of former baseball
Commissioner Ueberroth, "the owners hire you to make the tough decisions and then aban-
don you after you make them." Rob Rains, Who Will Rule ?, USA TODAY BASEBALL WKLY.,
Sept. 9-15, 1992, at 36.
101. See Murray Chass, Commissioner's Powers Are Diluted by Owners, N.Y. TirMS, Feb.
12, 1994, at 29, 32. In particular, the owners want to remove his best-interests powers in labor
matters and in matters that are covered by club votes. League matters include league expan-
sion, sale or relocation of clubs, interleague play, and league alignment. Under the revised
powers, the Commissioner could not intervene in collective bargaining matters. Termination
of the Commissioner is not mentioned in the report. See Major League Baseball News Re-
lease, Restructuring Report Enhances Commissioner's Authority 1 (1994). In a Congressional
Hearing before the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee, chairman Sen. Howard Metzenbaum
commented: "You don't have to be a genius,... a lawyer .... a Supreme Court Justice to
understand that, under this new agreement, you have denigrated the position of the Commis-
sioner." See Jerome Holtzman, Metzenbaum Takes a Senatorial Swing at Baseball Owners,
CHL TRm., Mar. 22, 1994, § 4, at 3.
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C. Conclusion
On the one hand, the Commissioner should be the centralized, ef-
ficent decision-maker for the owners. To be efficent for them, the Com-
missioner must protect their interests. An impartial and disinterested
Commissioner would result in inefficiency for the owners. On the other
hand, he is supposed to act as impartial authority in the dispute resolu-
tion and disciplinary context. That requires a completely different acting
by the Commissioner. However, a single Commissioner can only either
be efficient for the owners or impartial to all parties. Because of this
unavoidable conflict of interests, the traditional model of a single Com-
missioner cannot further both objectives of league organization at the
same time and does not provide a sufficient alternative.10 2
VI. ALTERNATIVE APPROACH FROM A CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE
A. The Pure Corporate Model
1. The Model
Corporate law principles provide an appropriate framework to or-
ganize a professional sports league. The owners would act as the board
of directors with the exclusive power to manage the league's affairs.
They would establish league policy and appoint a CEO to execute their
decisions by carrying out the ordinary, daily business. The CEO would
act under direct control and general supervision of the owners and serve
at the pleasure of the board.' Since the CEO has to protect exclusively
the owners' interests, there would be no conflict of interest with a CEO,
accountable only to the owners. Acting under the owner's control, the
CEO would be the centralized authority to represent the owners' policy
and interests in public. Moreover, it would allow owners, acting as a
board, to formulate policy decisions without fear of second-guessing by
the CEO because under the corporate structure, the board's decision is
definitive. 0 4 League decisions would be more predictable, certain and
efficent. Additionally, the accountability of the owners would be in-
creased. Since the CEO acts obviously and without any doubt on their
102. With the same conclusion: Durney, supra note 37, at 605; Willisch, supra note 67, at
1649; Note, supra note 97, at 709; Comment, supra note 7, at 798.
103. Jerry Reinsdorf, principal owner of the Chicago White Sox, said he would like to
have a CEO reporting to the owners as a board of directors. Newhan, supra note 95, at A9.
104. Willisch, supra note 67, at 1637. The ovners would also be protected from a courts
second-guessing by the business judgement rule, which states a rebuttable presumption that a
director acts in good faith and as a reasonable person. See Gries Sports Enter., Inc. v. Cleve-
land Browns Football Co., Inc., 496 N.E.2d 959 (Ohio 1986).
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behalf, the owners could be made responsible for unpopular decisions.
Therefore, under the corporate model, the efficiency of the decision-
making process would be enhanced significantly.
2. Criticism
The pure corporate model does not provide an appropriate concept
for three reasons. First, a professional sports league is acting in signifi-
cantly different circumstances than any other business corporation. For
the owners this is not just a usual investment, but an investment into the
"national pastime" of society.'05 This crucial involvement of the public
in their investment requires an extraordinary concept of balancing the
interests of the owners in their investment and of the public in the integ-
rity of the game. The pure corporate model does not provide such a
balancing system of control because the control of the owners is
exclusive.
Second, the CEO would not be an unbiased, independent and impar-
tial authority within the league to provide the basic due process.
Finally, when the owners act as a board of directors of the league,
they are subject to a duty of loyalty.10 6 However, the team owners have
a potentially conflicting personal interest in the profitability of their indi-
vidual franchises. They would be inclined to base their voting decisions
on what they believe to be most beneficial to their own teams rather
than voting for what they believe to be in the best interests of the
league. 0 7 Thus, it is almost impossible for the owners to put their per-
sonal interest second and to meet the duty of loyalty.
Therefore, even though the corporate model enhances the efficiency
of the decision-making process, it does not provide an internal, impartial
authority. Therefore, the corporate model in its pure form is not an ap-
propriate concept for a professional sports league.
105. See, eg., Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 364 (1953) (baseball
named as a "major asset" to the nation); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 266 (1972) (baseball
named as "everybody's business").
106. The duty of loyalty requires a director to place the corporation's interests above his
own interests in case of conflicting interests. See, e.g., Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct.
1944).
107. See, e.g., Willisch, supra note 67, at 1643-45 (for instance, increased revenue sharing
between the clubs might not be in the individual interest of the rich clubs, even though it
increases the competitive balance of the clubs and is economically in the interest of the league.
It is unlikely that the owners of the rich clubs vote for revenue sharing).
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B. The Hybrid Model - a Modified CEO and a Modified
Commissioner'08
The hybrid model is a division in governance responsibilities and is
built around a CEO who manages the business affairs of the league, and
a Commissioner who protects the integrity of the game. This concept
tries to avoid the disadvantages of the pure corporate model. It extends
the power of the CEO to address the duty of loyalty problem'0 9 and
establishes a modified Commissioner to provide an impartial authority
in order to balance the different interests.
1. Modification of the CEO's Power
Under the hybrid model, the CEO would be entrusted with the
power to make any decision in the "best economic interests of the
league." This authority would allow the CEO to override board deci-
sions that he determines are not in the best economic interests of the
league. In fact, the CEO would determine whether an owner breached
his duty of loyalty and acted in his own interests rather than in the inter-
ests of the league. To restrain the CEO from abusing his power, a deci-
sion could be overriden by the owners with a three-fourths vote. In
order to enable the CEO to resist political pressures by the owners, the
owners could terminate the CEO only by a two-third vote. The CEO
would preside at board meetings and vote only when necessary to break
a deadlock.
2. Modification of the Commissioner's Power
The Commissioner would be elected and employed by the owners
and would retain jurisdiction over the dispute resolution and disciplinary
process under the best interests clause. The position is modified in that
the Commissioner would lose the power for the decision-making process
which is granted to the CEO. To strenghten the position, the Commis-
sioner could only be terminated by a unanimous vote of the owners.
3. Criticism
First, the modification of the CEO's power is not sufficient to avoid
duty of loyalty violations by the owners. Indeed, the CEO may invoke
the "best economic interests" clause to obstruct measures determined to
108. The hybrid model is a proposal by Willisch to reconstruct Major League Baseball.
Willisch, supra note 67, at 1640-49.
109. See id.
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be not in the best economic interests of the game. However, the CEO
would not have enough standing against the owners to enforce this
clause. A powerful enforcement of the clause would mean that, on the
one hand, the CEO is executing the owners' decisions under their con-
trol, and on the other hand, the CEO is overriding their majority deci-
sions. It is not hard to imagine that a CEO, overriding a board's
decision, may face termination, since he is employed at will of the own-
ers.110 Therefore, a CEO takes job security into consideration when de-
ciding to invoke the clause. Thus, there is still the conflict of an
employee controlling actions by his own employer."'
Second, the modification of the Commissioner's power is not suffi-
cient to provide an impartial and effective internal authority, as now the
Commissioner would be elected by the owners without any involvment
of other participants. The hybrid model addresses the conflict by requir-
ing a unanimous vote for the termination of the Commissioner. Indeed,
there would be a high threshhold to discharge him by a board decision.
However, this requirement does not avoid the Commissioner's conflict.
The Commissioner still has an interest to act primarily in favor of the
owners based on his personal interest to be reelected by the owners after
his term has expired. Moreover, even a majority decision by the owners
to terminate his term might put enough political pressure on him forcing
him to resign voluntarily." 2
Therefore, the hybrid model does not establish an impartial and fair
authority for the dispute and disciplinary process. Thus, it does not fur-
ther the second objective of league organization and is not a sufficient
alternative.
C. The Panel Model - a CEO and Reconstruction of the Dispute
Resolution and Disciplinary Process
The panel model is based upon the division of governance responsi-
bility as well and proposes two major changes in the present league or-
ganization. First, it establishes the position of a CEO. Second, to
balance the interests of the parties and to address the specific circum-
stances of the professional sports league, it reconstructs the dispute and
110. The proposed requirement of a two-third vote under the hybrid model merely
reduces this conflict, but does not avoid it.
111. See supra part V.A. Here the conflict is even stronger, because the CEO is acting
under direct control of the owners.
112. Compare the resignation of the baseball Commissioner Fay Vincent. The owners did
not try to terminate him, but made a vote of no confidence and thereby put political pressure
on him to resign. See supra note 95.
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disciplinary process and abolishes the office of the Commissioner in the
traditional way.
1. The CEO
Under the panel model, the position of the CEO is similar to the
CEO under the pure corporate model.113 Thus, the owners act as the
board of directors with the exclusive decision-making authority and their
decisions are executed by an appointed CEO, acting under their control.
Yet, in order to do justice to the specific circumstances of a professional
sports league," 4 the CEO should be given a stronger position. The CEO
could be terminated only by a two-third vote of the owners and would be
the designated chairman of the board, where he votes when necessary to
break a deadlock. 115
2. Reconstruction of the Dispute Resolution and Disciplinary Process
a. Federal Agency
Since the issues and disputes in the several sports leagues are similar,
one alternative might be to establish a federal agency for professional
sports." 6 A federal agency could provide uniform national regulations
applicable to all sports and acquire great expertise, since its sole function
would be to regulate and supervise professional sports." 7 Such a federal
agency has been set up by Congress in the past for self-regulatory orga-
nizations in other areas." 8 However, as private associations, leagues
have the basic right to police and formulate themselves, which sets a
113. See supra part VI.A. His power is measured under the standard of a usual business
corporation's CEO.
114. A professional sports league as a private association is not owned by the team own-
ers like other corporations are owned by shareholders. The league has a characteristic of a
joint venture of independent business men. A CEO of the league does not deal merely with
usual owners of "his" corporation, but deals with more than twenty independent business
people, all operating their own teams and joined in a common league.
115. This is an element of the CEO's modification under the hybrid model. See supra part
VI.B.2.
116. See Comment, supra note 7, at 795-798 (outlines a structure for a federal agency
dealing merely with discipline matters).
117. Id. at 795.
118. For example, the Securities Exchange Commission was implemented pursuant to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988). The Commission has the power to
regulate the exchanges and the entities registered as a self regulatory organization. See David
A. Skeel, Some Corporate And Securities Law Perspectives On Student Athletes and the
NCAA, MicH. L. REv. (forthcoming 1995, on file with author) (discussion to subject the activ-
ities of the NCAA and its member universities to external oversight in form of securities-
styled regulation in form of the SEC).
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high standard for outside interference. 119 As far as possible, a private
association should be able to act without external interference. On the
other hand, the approach to establish a federal agency for the profes-
sional sports leagues draws support from the fact that "sports have thus
far failed to establish a disciplinary system which adequately protects the
interests of both the public and the players."' 20
Yet, under practical considerations the realization of a federal agency
for sports seems questionable. The owners have a strong interest in ex-
ercising their right not to be governed by outside forces.' 2 ' Because of
the owner's disinterest and reluctance to subject their business to an
outside authority, the concept of a federal agency is highly unlikely.
Likewise, an initiative by Congress appears unlikely with regard to the
long lasting unwillingness of Congress to intervene in the sports business
(e.g., failing to withdraw the baseball antitrust exemption). Besides, the
creation of a federal agency entails significant administrative expenses,
which makes such a step harder to enforce politically."a Based on these
practical obstacles, it is unlikely that a federal agency will be established
as a disciplinary authority.
b. The Panel
Under the panel model, the parties are subject to the dispute resolu-
tion and disciplinary authority of an Internal Arbitration and Discipli-
nary Panel (IADP). The establishment of the panel is based upon
involvment of both the owners and the players, since, as shown above,
the election of the disciplinary authority by the owners alone causes an
unavoidable conflict of interest for the Commissioner.
The IADP would be a tripartite panel. The concept of a tripartite
panel is consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act'23 and is used in
several other organizations as well.' 4 In particular, baseball's collective
bargaining agreement established such a procedure for its arbitration on
salaries and grievances involving matters not presented to the
Commissioner.'2
119. See, e.g., Durney, supra note 37, at 624.
120. Comment, supra note 7, at 796 (footnote omitted).
121. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 116, at 64; Comment, supra note 7, at 796.
123. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (Supp. I 1995).
124. See, e.g., the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), art. XXII (arbitra-
tion panel established with the same election procedure).
125. See Basic Agreement, supra note 56, art. XI, A(9). Therefore, establishing the IADP
could extend the procedure and methods already used.
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Under the panel model, each party shall appoint one member to the
panel, and a third member is chosen by the first two members as the
designated panel chairman. 126 This concept ensures an balanced in-
volvement of both the players and the owners and, thus, provides impar-
tiality of the chairman. The chairman would not be subject to a conflict
of interest like the present Commissioner.
Usually, a tripartite panel issues panel decisions, decided by all three
members of the panel. However, the panel model proposes a different
approach. The owners and the players should agree to let the Chairman
decide the issues alone, treating him as an umpire and the other two
arbitrators as advocates and agents of the designating party.'2 7 Conse-
quently, the model suggests that both the owners appoint the CEO and
the players the Executive Director of the Players Association. The parti-
ality of the executives would not bar them from being members of the
IADP.'2 8 The appointed executives would act as agents and representa-
tives of their parties in the panel. The involvement of these two chief
executives would avoid inefficiency arising if too many persons were
given authority. As the decision-maker, these two personalities bring
the greatest knowledge of the parties' respective positions into the panel.
The executives could bring their position fast and informally to the
Chairman who could discuss and evaluate the facts of a dispute with the
executives before issuing a decision.
To strengthen the position, the Chairman would be elected for a term
of five years and terminated by a three-fourths majority of both the own-
ers and the players. Thus, there would still be a strong, single person
with the authority to act promptly and without delay. The Chairman's
power to decide alone enhances the accountability of the panel, since the
decisions are identified as coming from a single person. On the other
hand, although a single person is deciding, both parties are represented
equally on the panel. This might avoid potential conflicts because higher
acceptance of an internal authority reduces the likelihood of a challenge
of an authority in court.
126. In the event the parties cannot agree on a fixed period of time, they shall request that
the American Arbitration Association furnish them with a list of arbitrators. Upon receipt of
said list, the parties shall alternate in striking names from the list until one remains. For
example, baseball's Basic Agreement uses this approach. See id.
127. See, e.g., Petrol Corp. v. Groupment D'Achat Des Carburants, 84 F. Supp. 446
(S.D.N.Y. 1949) (this construction was held by the court as consistent with the law).
128. See, e.g., M. De Matteo Const. Co. v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 184 F. Supp. 907,
913 (Me. 1960) (a party of an arbitration panel employed by one party or acting as an agent of
one party does not itself disqualify him from acting as independent arbitrator or umpire if the
parties so agree).
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The newly created panel would provide basic due process and, there-
fore, avoid judicial interference under the Federal Arbitration Act.12 9
Although arbitration agreements do not deprive the National Labor Re-
lations Board (NLRB) of jurisdiction, the NLRB has stated that it will
decline jurisdiction where the arbitration proceedings are fair and
regular.130
Accordingly, under the panel model, the traditional role of the Com-
missioner would be abolished. In fact, he would act as the chairman of
the panel, elected by both parties, responsible for the dispute and disci-
plinary process and without decision-making power.
3. Allocation of Power between the CEO and the Chairman of the
Disciplinary and Arbitration Panel
With the division of power, some questions arise about the allocation
of power between the CEO and the chairman of the panel. Since the
owners are the money investors, they have a legitmate interest in con-
trolling league matters. Their executive organ would be the CEO with
the exclusive decision-making power. The CEO's authority would in-
clude control over the season, rules, and marketing, and the CEO would
promulgate administrative rules and regulations. Further, he would
make the strategic league decisions and act as the official spokesperson
of the game with the long range interests of the game in mind.
The chairman of the panel would function reactively with authority
for dispute resolution and disciplinary actions. The arbitration authority
would include salary arbitration, grievance arbitration, and arbitration of
all disputes between any parties about the intepretation of any league or
collective bargaining agreement.
Further, the Chairman would ensure the integrity of the game
through his disciplinary power. The disciplinary power, given by the
"best interests" clause, would be applicable to any action of any party
not in the best interests of the game. All parties would be subject to the
disciplinary power of the Chairman. To maintain the integrity of the
game, the executive decisions of the board and the CEO would also be
reviewable. In fact, if management decisions affect the integrity of the
game, the Chairman must have the power to override the decisions and
129. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1992) (provides the reasons a court may reverse the decision of an
arbitrator; e.g., fraud, corruption, partiality, bias or prejudice).
130. The NLRB will not hesitate to interfere where they determine unfair practices. See,
e.g., Murray Chass, Labor Board to Seek Injunction Against Baseball Club Owners, N.Y.
TiMEs, Mar. 27, 1995, at Al (in the baseball strike in 1994-95 the NLRB sought a preliminary
injunction against the owners based upon unfair labor practices).
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demand new consideration of the issue. Consequently, management de-
cisions would not be protected from review by the wide scope of the
business judgment rule. This is an important distinction between the or-
ganization of the professional sports league under the panel model and a
usual business corporation. This is necessary because of the public inter-
est in the game and the owners' problem of acting in compliance with
the duty of loyalty. 3' Otherwise, the Chairman would not be an effec-
tive method of internal control. Thus, the Panel, acting through its im-
partial Chairman, would possess strong authority in order to protect the
integrity of the game. This authority ensures a balance between the in-
terests of the owners, the players and the game.
An example of this model might be the player's strike in baseball.
The dispute between the parties was able to escalate because of the lack
of an impartial authority within the league. 3 ' Under the panel model,
the Chairman would be the disinterested and impartial referee, author-
ized to control the bargaining process between players and owners. This
control would give the Chairman the authority to set the day, place, and
agenda of the bargaining sessions and to force both parties to bargain
seriously and effectively from the beginning.133 The Chairman could act
efficiently by communicating with the executives of both sides quickly
and informally in form of the panel structure.
Even though this approach might not ensure successful action by the
Chairman in this "morality play"'134 in which even the President's inter-
vention could not settle the dispute, it might have avoided the escalation
of the dispute and the cancellation of the World Series for the first time
in ninety-two years. In particular, the Chairman could force the parties
under the "best interests"' 35 clause to play the game and, thus, intervene
effectively in the collective bargaining process as a neutral authority.
The decision of the Chairman should receive a high acceptance by both
parties since they would have elected him to act as an impartial
authority.
131. See supra part VI.A.1.
132. See, e.g., Dolson, supra note 91, at C2 (citing view of former National League presi-
dent Bill White).
133. One problem during the strike was the long breaks between the bargaining sessions.
It seems the parties had difficulty agreeing about the day and place of bargaining.
134. Fay Vincent (Commissioner of baseball between 1989 and 1992), What Baseball
Needs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1995, at A25.
135. In fact, there is less doubt that the baseball strike was not in the best interests of the
game.
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Moreover, the owners could act more efficiently in the bargaining
process through their CEO. As centralized spokesperson of the owners,
the CEO could represent a unanimous opinion of the owners in the bar-
gaining process, which could avoid any confusion about the owners' po-
sition in a labor dispute.
VII. CONCLUSION
The necessity for an alternative approach does not seem to be urgent
with regard to the present economic success of the professional sports
leagues under their Commissioners.136 However, this Article does not
measure the present legal concept solely under its economic success. As
a matter of fact, the professional sports leagues increasingly find them-
selves in court. The efficiency of the several leagues and the security of
player incomes are threatened by long and painful labor disputes be-
tween the parties. This is not only a result of the league's economic sys-
tem and a disputed division of revenues. The present problematic
situation in professional major league sports is, inter alia, also a conse-
quence of an insufficient organizational league structure 37 with which
neither the owners nor the players can be satisfied. For the owners, the
present governance structure is not efficient enough, which is why they
intend to reconstruct the power of the Commissioner. For the players,
the system seems structered significantly in favor of the owners. There-
fore, the traditional single person commissioner cannot provide a suffi-
cient alternative for the expectations of both parties. The Commissioner
under the present governance structure is subject to an unavoidable con-
flict of interest, which makes it impossible for him to act in favor of both
parties. Thus, the position of the Commissioner in the traditional form
needs to be reversed.
The panel model might be a considerable alternative to the present
system. The panel model suggest dividing the governance responsibili-
ties and sets up two positions. First, a CEO would be the efficient deci-
sion-maker for the owners and official spokesperson of the game.
Secondly, an internal and impartial panel is given the authority for the
arbitration and disciplinary process. The model further suggests al-
lowing the impartial chairman of the panel to independently decide and
136. The NFL under Commissioner Paul Tagliabue and the NBA under Commissioner
David Stern have enormous economical success under their strong and powerful leadership.
The NHL elected Gary Bettman as its first Commissioner, modeled after David Stem. See
Lapointe, supra note 31, at 34.
137. See, e.g., Vincent, supra note 134, at A25 (the old Commissioner Fay Vincent claims
that baseball needs new ideas and new methods under new leaders).
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to appoint the chief executives of both the players and the owners to the
panel as agents of their parties. This governance structure would sup-
port the integrity of the game, do justice to the different interests of the
participants and provide fairness to all sides. In sports, fairness is not
only required by the parties on the field, but also by the parties off-the-
field. The leagues should carefully consider their organizational struc-
ture and remind the words of acting Commissioner Bud Selig: "We are
where we are now, because we repressed these problems like Scarlett
O'Hara: 'We'll think about tomorrow.' 138
138. Dave Van Dyck & Brian Hanley, Little Guys at Root of the Shutdowns In Baseball,
CHI. SUN TiMES, Oct. 14, 1994, at 128 (citing Commissioner Bud Selig).
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